It is a striking fact that the world of individuals is divided into those that can, and those that cannot, move themselves. The autographed baseball on my desk sits there, and will continue to do so unless someone picks it up. If it is thrown, it will move, but not under its own power. By contrast, human beings are all capable of initiating, and not merely undergoing, bodily motion. But what is it about humans that accounts for the fact that they can move themselves? One simple answer to this question is that, unlike baseballs, humans have a will, that the bodily motions that they themselves initiate are voluntary. It is also a striking fact that we often take human beings to be responsible, indeed praiseworthy and blameworthy, for their actions. Moreover, it is commonly supposed that responsibility, praise, and blame attach to free rather than to un-free actions.
6 judgment of the understanding regarding the good (end or means): intellectualists (including Thomas Aquinas and his followers) held that it is, while voluntarists (including Arminians and Molinists, among them Bramhall) held that it is not. Interestingly, one's position in this debate determines one's position on the question of the possibility of weakness of will. For if, as the Thomists hold, the will is determined with respect to specification by the last judgment of the understanding regarding the good, then it is not possible for the soul to aim at the bad (or the worse) knowingly, and hence akrasia in the domain of specification is impossible. But if, as the Arminians and Molinists hold, the will is not determined with respect to specification by the last judgment of the understanding regarding the good (but is rather determined by the soul, as it is with respect to exercise), then it is possible for the soul to aim at the bad (or the worse) knowingly, and hence akrasia in the domain of specification is possible.
These disagreements were driven in large part by a tension at the heart of the scholastic conception of the will. On the one hand, following Aristotle, it is tempting to conceive of the will as the power of rational appetite. On the other, again following Aristotle, it is tempting to recognize the possibility of weakness of will. But these two conceptions do not sit comfortably with each other. If the will is the power of rational appetite, then it is determined to follow the greatest perceived good. But if akrasia is possible, then the will can choose the apparent bad (or the apparently worse), and hence is not determined to follow the greatest perceived good. Molinists and Arminians, such as Bramhall, are stuck with the tension. Thomists reduce the tension by giving up on the possibility of akrasia, at least in the case of specification of the power of choice. As we 7 will see, Hobbes, Cudworth, and Locke find interestingly different ways of avoiding the tension altogether.
So much for the scholastic conception of the will. With regard to the relation between will and act, the scholastics provided a fourfold typology of human action, helpfully, but also somewhat misleadingly, summarized by Bramhall in the following passage:
Some acts proceed wholly from an extrinsical cause; as the throwing of a stone upwards, a rape, or the drawing of a Christian by plain force to the idol's temple; these are called violent acts. Secondly, some proceed from an intrinsical cause, but without any manner of knowledge of the end, as the falling of a stone downwards; these are called natural acts. Thirdly, some proceed from an internal principle, with an imperfect knowledge of the end, where there is an appetite to the object, but no deliberation nor election; as the acts of fools, children, beasts, and the inconsiderate acts of men of judgment. These are called voluntary or spontaneous acts. Fourthly, some proceed from an intrinsical cause, with a more perfect knowledge of the end, which are elected upon deliberation. These are called free acts. (ibid, V. 84) Bramhall here suggests that voluntary (or spontaneous) acts are those that proceed from rational desire for an end that is only imperfectly known, without choice or deliberation among alternative means for achieving the end. This is very close, but not in fact identical to, his considered view. For, as he says elsewhere (in the same section): 'I distinguish between free acts and voluntary acts. The former are always deliberate, the latter may be indeliberate; all free acts are voluntary, but all voluntary acts are not free [i.e., not all voluntary acts are free]' (ibid, V. 81-2). Strictly speaking, then, voluntary or spontaneous actions may, though they need not, be chosen upon deliberation, whereas free acts must be chosen upon deliberation. The most important difference between free 8 acts and merely-voluntary-but-unfree acts is that the former require more perfect, while the latter are based on less perfect, knowledge of the end. 2 According to Bramhall, there are two main kinds of freedom or liberty, freedom to act and freedom to will. Freedom of action is a property of a human being; freedom to will is a property of the will (and so, indirectly, of the soul). A human being H is free with respect to action A if and only if H has the power to do A or not A, which of the two H chooses. Freedom of action therefore requires the ability to do otherwise. Freedom to will comes in two varieties, depending on whether it concerns simple willing (liberty of exercise) or choice (liberty of specification). A soul S is free with respect to a simple willing W (or choice C) if and only if when all things are present which are needful to produce W (or C), S can nevertheless not produce W (or C) (see ibid, V. 385).
As the scholastics understood 'ability', determinism (the thesis that every event proceeds from extrinsic necessary causes that necessitate it, such that it is impossible for the event not to have occurred) is logically incompatible with both freedom of action and freedom to will, for determinism makes it impossible for a human being to have done, or for a soul to have willed or chosen, otherwise. The scholastics, including Bramhall, were therefore incompatibilists. In respect of the freedom to will, all scholastics were agreed 2 On Bramhall's view, the main enemy of voluntariness (and hence of freedom) is ignorance (Hobbes 1839 (Hobbes -1845 : 'Invincible and antecedent ignorance doth destroy the nature of spontaneity or voluntariness, by removing that knowledge which should and would have prohibited the action. As a man thinking to shoot a wild beast in a bush, shoots his friend, which if he had known, he would not have shot. This man did not kill his friend of his own accord'. 9 that a human soul's simple willings are determined by the will, and not by any necessary causes extrinsic to the will. On their view, then, every human being is free with respect to any act of simple willing. But, as we have seen, Thomists and Molinists/Arminians disagreed about whether choices are determined by the last dictate of the understanding, the former holding that they are, the latter holding that they are not. Consequently, Molinists and Arminians (such as Bramhall) affirmed, while Thomists denied, that human beings have freedom with respect to any act of choice. For Bramhall, then, human souls have both liberty of exercise and liberty of specification.
3 And given his incompatibilism, Bramhall is therefore committed to the falsity of determinism.
HOBBES
Apart from agreeing on the nature of freedom of action, Hobbes and Bramhall disagree about almost everything else relevant to issues involving the will. 4 The main reason for this is that Hobbes is a devotee of the new anti-scholastic, anti-hylomorphic mechanistic science. On this view, the explanation of natural phenomena is not based, as it is on the scholastic picture, on knowledge of substantial forms, but rather on knowledge of the size, shape, weight, hardness, and motion of material corpuscles. Indeed, Hobbes's metaphysics does away with the hylomorphic conception of substance altogether. Human beings, on Hobbes's picture, are nothing but specially organized bundles of material corpuscles. Hobbes makes room for the soul, but thinks of it as a material thing, rather than as the form of the body. Hobbes also makes room for sensation, imagination, appetite, and reason, but conceives all of these operations of the soul as various types of corpuscular motions. Sense is 'motion in the organs and interior parts of man's body, caused by the action of the things we see, hear, etc.', imagination 'is but the relics of
[sense]', and appetites, being the imaginings 'of whither, which way, and what', are the 'small beginnings of motion within the body of man, before they appear in walking, speaking, striking, and other visible actions ' (ibid, . Even 'reason and understanding also are acts of the imagination, that is to say, they are imaginations' (ibid, V. 401 -see also ibid, V. 358).
Because appetites are 'small beginnings of motion', it makes no sense to distinguish, as Bramhall does, between rational and irrational appetites. 5 It follows that on the Hobbesian picture, the will cannot be identified either with the soul's power of rational appetite or with individual rational appetites. To understand Hobbes's conception of the will, one needs to understand his conception of deliberation. As Hobbes conceives it, deliberation is, generally speaking, 'the considering of the good and evil sequels of the action to come' (ibid, V. 389), but more particularly, deliberation occurs 'when in the mind of man appetites and aversions, hopes and fears, concerning one and the same thing, arise alternately; and diverse good and evil consequences of the doing or omitting the thing propounded come successively into our thoughts ' (ibid, III. 47 Hobbes writes that 'voluntary presupposeth deliberation, when the judgment, whether the action be voluntary or not, is not in the actor, but in the judge', and more particularly, that 'the action of a man that is not a child, in public judgment how rash, inconsiderate, and sudden soever it be, it is to be taken for deliberation; because it is supposed, he ought to have considered and compared his intended action with the law; when, nevertheless, that sudden and indeliberate action was truly voluntary' (ibid, V. 94). Hobbes's point is that although some voluntary actions (such as rash acts) were not chosen upon deliberation, a judge of those acts will, for purposes of the administration of justice, suppose that they 7 For a different reading of Hobbes's position on whether voluntariness presupposes deliberation, see Sleigh, Chappell, and Della Rocca 1998: 1219. were, on the grounds that the agent 'ought to have deliberated, and had time enough to deliberate whether the action were lawful or not ' (ibid, V. 350 For Bramhall, a free human agent is one who has both freedom of action and freedom to will, both liberty of exercise and liberty of specification. As Hobbes sees it, there is and can be no more to freedom than freedom of action: 'It cannot be conceived that there is any liberty greater than for a man to do what he will, and to forbear what he will … He that can do what he will, hath all liberty possible; and he that cannot, has none at all' (ibid, V. 249-50). Hobbes's position is that the soul has no freedom to will, a thesis that follows directly from his conception of volition. For the Hobbesian will is nothing but the power of appetite, and every volition is no more than the last appetite in the course of deliberation. So, as Hobbes sees it, freedom to will would have to consist in freedom to desire, which would itself have to consist in the ability to desire what one chooses to desire and the ability to forbear desiring what one chooses not to desire. But, Hobbes holds, it is nonsense to suppose that anyone should have these sorts of abilities.
Human beings do not and cannot choose to desire, or not to desire, this or that. X has finished deliberating (for 'there are no impediments but to the action, whilst we are endeavouring to do it, which is not till we have done deliberating' -ibid, V. 366-7), and hence that if X has not finished deliberating, then there are no external impediments to X's doing A, and hence X is free with respect to A.
11
Given his conception of freedom as freedom of action, it is unsurprising that Hobbes (unlike Bramhall) is a compatibilist. As Hobbes sees it, it is possible for human actions to be causally determined (indeed, necessitated), even as humans are free to do as they will, for freedom is no more than the ability to do, and to forbear doing, as one wills.
Indeed, Hobbes holds the radical position that this situation is not only possible, but also scholastics in refusing to think of the will as rational desire, and differs from Hobbes in refusing to think of the will as the faculty of desire simpliciter: as he sees it, the hegemonic is not a desiderative faculty at all.
Like Bramhall, Cudworth allows for the possibility of weakness of will. As he says: 'A man's soul as hegemonical over itself … may, upon slight considerations and immature deliberations … choose and prefer that which is really worse before the better'
(ibid, X. 178-9). But whereas Bramhall's acceptance of weakness of will does not sit well with his identification of the will with the power of rational desire (see above),
Cudworth's non-desiderative conception of the hegemonic enables him to avoid this tension altogether.
Given his acceptance of the possibility of weak-willed action, Cudworth is unsurprisingly hostile to scholastic intellectualism. For if, as intellectualists hold, the will always follows the last dictate of the understanding, and if the understanding, as
Cudworth admits, is judge of apparent goodness and badness, then akrasia would be impossible. But Cudworth's hostility to intellectualism stems also from his resistance to 20 determinism, the truth of which, on his view, would unacceptably rob all praise, blame, repentance, and punishment of any justification (ibid, 1).
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But if the understanding does not move the hegemonic, what does? Cudworth's answer is that the hegemonic is special in having the ability to move itself. In support of this claim, Cudworth offers the following argument. First, the hegemonic (and hence the soul whose ruling principle it is) is self-conscious, in that it can 'intend and exert itself'
(ibid, XIII. 185). And second, whatever is self-conscious is capable of self-motion: 'That which is thus conscious of itself, and reflexive upon itself, may also as well act upon itself, either as fortuitously determining its own activity or else as intending and exerting itself more or less in order to the promoting of its own good' (ibid, XIX. 201). Against
Hobbes's objections that (i) nothing is capable of moving itself and (ii) nothing can be both agent and patient (with respect to itself), Cudworth insists that Hobbes mistakenly applies 'that to all being whatsoever, which is the property of body only' (ibid, XVIII.
199). For, Cudworth insists, the existence of corporeal motion requires the existence of an unmoved, self-moving mover, and hence is proof that self-motion is not only possible, but actual.
14 Apart from exercising the Platonic function of resisting the lower affections, Cudworth's hegemonic also works to engage in and stop speculation and deliberation.
This fact is one of which we have empirical knowledge, presumably by introspection:
We know, by certain experience, that speculation or deliberation about particular things is determined by ourselves both as to objects and exercise; we can call it off from one thing, and employ it or set it a work upon another, and we can surcease, suspend, and stop the exercise of it (when we please) too, diverting that such freedom requires the ability to do otherwise, and that the ability to do otherwise requires the power of self-determination that uniquely belongs to the soul's hegemonic.
In addition to freedom of action, then, true freedom requires the freedom to will, to engage in and stop speculation and deliberation, as one pleases.
Cudworth's contribution to the debate about freedom and necessity thus consists in his attempt to frame a point of view that cuts across the lines of disagreement that separate Bramhall from Hobbes. On the one hand, like Hobbes, Cudworth jettisons
Bramhall's scholastic assumptions, including the conception of the soul as unitary, as well as the conception of the will as rational desire. On the other hand, as against Hobbes, Cudworth embraces Bramhall's incompatibilism and his insistence that there is such a thing as free will (or freedom of will) distinct from freedom of action.
The main question for Cudworth, of course, is whether there is such a thing as the soul's hegemonic as he conceives of it. Part of Cudworth's hostility to the scholastic theory of mind derives from a Hobbesian disdain for treating the powers of the mind as homuncular agents. Echoing Hobbes's criticisms of Bramhall, Cudworth famously opines:
But this scholastic philosophy is manifestly absurd, and mere scholastic jargon. For to attribute the act of intellection and perception to the faculty of understanding, and acts of volition to the faculty of will, or to say that it is the understanding that understandeth, and the will that willeth -this is all one as if one should say that the faculty of walking walketh, and the faculty of speaking speaketh, or that the musical faculty playeth a lesson upon the lute, or sings this or that tune … All this while it is really the man or soul that understands, and the man or soul that wills, as it is the man that walks and the man that speaks or talks, and the musician that plays a lesson on the lute. So that it is one and the same subsistent thing, one and the same soul that both understandeth and willeth, and the same agent only that acteth diversely. (ibid, VII.
170-1)
In some places Cudworth is careful to suggest, consistently with this approach, that the hegemonic is nothing more than a power that the soul possesses. 16 But in other places, Cudworth treats the hegemonic as an agent within the soul that possesses this power. 
182).
17 For example, Cudworth writes of a 'power over ourselves, which belongs to the hegemonicon of the soul' (ibid, XIII. 185), and insists that 'there is in us some one hegemonical, which comprehending all the other powers, energies, and capacities of our soul…having a power of intending and exerting itself more or less, determineth, not only actions, but also the whole passive capability of our nature one way or other' (ibid, XVI.
193).
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And in yet other places Cudworth writes as if the hegemonic is the entire soul, considered in a certain way, namely as possessing this power.
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Cudworth's problem is that he is frankly pulled in two opposite directions. On the one hand, he cannot accept the scholastic hypostatization of the will. On the other hand, his Platonic conception of the soul encourages his treatment of the hegemonic (a counterpart of Plato's Reason) as an agent endowed with powers of its own. And this Platonic conception is reinforced by separate considerations related to the need to explain the soul's essential unity. As Cudworth sees it, the soul would be incapable of motion and action if it did not have a guiding principle controlling its various appetites and affections. Thus, for example, Cudworth writes:
I say there being so many wheels in this machine of our souls, unless they be all aptly knit and put together, so as to conspire into one, and unless there be some one thing presiding over them, intending itself more or less, directing, and ordering, and giving the fiat for action, it could not go forwards in motion, but there must be a confusion and distraction in it, and we must needs be perpetually in puzzle. 19 (ibid, XVI. 194) There is therefore a fundamental and ineradicable tension at the heart of Cudworth's conception of the soul. And this tension makes it impossible for him to provide a fully satisfactory philosophical solution to the problem of free will. with respect to the same action at the same time establishes 'that desiring and willing are two distinct Acts of the mind' (Essay II.xxi.30: 250). Instead, Locke 2 identifies the will with the 'Power which the mind has, thus to order the consideration of any Idea, or the forbearing to consider it; or to prefer the motion of any part of the body to its rest, and vice versa in any particular instance' (Essay II.xxi.5: 236). The will, then, as Locke 2 conceives it, is a power to command (rather than to desire) mental operations and bodily motions (and hence volitions are individual mental commands (Essay II.xxi.28: 248)). The point of the example, of course, is that it is possible to perform an action voluntarily, even as one is not free to forbear performing it. 25 Locke considers the question whether it is appropriate to attribute freedom to the will, as Bramhall does. But, like Hobbes, Locke finds the question 'unreasonable, because unintelligible', for 'Liberty, which is but a power, belongs only to Agents, and cannot be an attribute or modification of the Will, which is also but a Power' (Essay II.xxi.14: 240). The fundamental problem, as Locke sees it, is that it is metaphysically impossible for powers to be endowed with powers. Powers are, as the scholastics would put it, modifications of substance, ways for a substance to be. As such, they cannot themselves be modified.
LOCKE
But the fact that the will cannot itself be free does not entail that humans are not free to will. But in the fifth edition, the passage continues (with the additions underlined):
[A]nd so it is in regard of all other Actions in our power so proposed, which are the far greater number. For considering the vast number of voluntary Actions, that succeed one another every moment that we are awake, in the course of our Lives, there are but few of them that are thought on or proposed to the Will, 'till the time they are to be done: And in all such Actions, as I have shewn, the Mind in respect of willing has not a power to act, or not to act, wherein consists Liberty: The Mind in that case has not a power to forbear willing.
What these additions make clear is that Locke 5 does not accept the Unavoidability Thesis in all generality, but only accepts the version of the thesis that is restricted to those actions that are not 'proposed to the Will, 'till the time they are to be done', namely stoppings of processes in which one is currently engaged.
Importantly, when (3) is suitably restricted to this particular subset of the set of all actions, Leibniz's objection no longer applies, and (3) it is in fact the answer to the question that Locke takes to be absurd. As Locke sees it, the relevant question 'needs no answer' precisely because the correct answer to it is obvious.
The reason is plain. Consider whether S is free with respect to any one of his volitions (say, V). According to Locke, S is free with respect to V if and only if: S can perform V if S wills to perform V, and S can fail to perform V if S wills not to perform V. But, as
Locke sees it, to will to perform V is just to perform V and to will not to perform V is just to fail to perform V. Consequently, S is free with respect to V if and only if: S can perform V if S performs V, and S can fail to perform V if S fails to perform V. It follows immediately from the principle that actuality entails possibility that agents are all free with respect to their volitions.
Locke therefore provide a (qualified) negative answer to the first question and an unqualified positive answer to the second. On his view, human beings are free to will what they actually will, both because they have the power to will and because they have the power to suspend willing. Despite the general Hobbesian tenor of his theory of the will as a power rather than an agent, Locke's endorsement of the Doctrine of Suspension shows that his views do diverge significantly from Hobbes's, and converge with Bramhall's and Cudworth's, in at least one important respect. One of Locke's great intellectual achievements, then, is that he was able to cull important insights from his predecessors without thereby cobbling together an internally incoherent theory.
But Locke's theory of will and motivation is not problem-free. Like Hobbes, but unlike Bramhall and Cudworth, Locke denies that the will is self-determined. Even in the case of free, voluntary actions, one's volitions are determined by one's desires, principally desires to be rid of pain or uneasiness. Thus if a subject S wills to suspend willing, what determines her volition to suspend is a desire D1 to be rid of pain, presumably pain at the thought of what would likely happen if she did not suspend. But now, on Locke's mature view, S has the power to suspend her prosecution of D1: she can fail to follow D1, precisely in order to consider whether following D1 conduces to her happiness. But given that the will is not self-determined, it follows that what determines S's suspension of the prosecution of D1 is another desire (call it 'D2') to be rid of pain, presumably pain at the thought of what would likely happen if she did not suspend her prosecution of D1. But Locke also holds that S has the power to suspend the prosecution of D2, and hence it follows from the rest of his views that what determines S's suspension of the prosecution of D2 is yet another desire (call it 'D3') to be rid of pain.
And thus we are led to accept the existence of an infinite regress of desires and volitions to suspend them. This infinite regress problem, one that Locke himself never considered, continues to plague Lockean accounts of the relation between volition and motivation.
CONCLUSION
The development of philosophical opinion on the subject of will and motivation in seventeenth-century Britain is complex but rational. The story begins with an acrimonious debate between a strong proponent of a form of incompatibilist Aristotelianism (Bramhall) and a vigorous exponent of the new scientific, compatibilist and anti-Aristotelian, mechanical philosophy (Hobbes) . This debate, which frames the conversation on these topics for the next fifty years, is altered by the powerful but occasionally confused contributions of the incompatibilist and anti-Aristotelian
Cambridge Platonists (such as Cudworth), and reaches its apotheosis in the work of Locke. It is a strong testament to Locke's intellectual honesty that he finds the need to craft a theory of freedom and voluntariness that borrows insights from all of his predecessors. This theory, though not problem-free, is remarkable in its coherent explanation of the possibility of weakness of will and its accommodation of the Doctrine of Suspension within a compatibilist, Hobbesian conception of freedom as freedom of 37 action. Locke's theory remains a shining paradigm of generous intellectual synthesis, and in this respect deserves our everlasting admiration.
